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14 
TOXIC SOLID WASTE LEACHING FROM 
TELEPHONE POLES? NAVIGATING 
AMBIGUOUS DEFINITIONS IN RCRA 
CADESBY B. COOPER* 
Abstract: This Comment analyzes the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s ruling in Ecological Rights Foundation v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. The 
plaintiff alleged that two utility companies operated utility poles that discharged 
wood preservative in violation of the Clean Water Act and the Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act (RCRA). The plaintiff’s RCRA claim depended on 
whether the wood preservative was a “solid waste” according to the Act. The 
Ninth Circuit dismissed the claims but acknowledged that RCRA has two defini-
tions of solid waste, and the wood preservative was not a solid waste according 
to the Plaintiff’s allegations, which only implicated the narrow regulatory defini-
tion. The court’s decision leaves open the possibility that RCRA could apply to 
wood preservative under other circumstances. This Comment analyzes the dis-
tinction between the solid waste definitions of RCRA and the circumstances un-
der which RCRA might be applicable to wood preservative. 
INTRODUCTION 
Thirteen countries have banned the general biocide pentachlorophenol 
(PCP) outright due to its high toxicity.1 The United States, however, permits 
the use of PCP as a heavy-duty wood preservative.2 In front of the homes and 
along the roads of America stand 36 million wooden utility poles that leach 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2013–2014. 
 1 U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. AND SOC. AFF., CONSOLIDATED LIST OF PRODUCTS WHOSE CONSUMP-
TION AND/OR SALE HAVE BEEN BANNED, WITHDRAWN, OR SEVERELY RESTRICTED OR NOT AP-
PROVED BY GOVERNMENTS, ELEVENTH ISSUE 270–72 (2005) (listing eighteen countries that ban the 
use of PCP); U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. AND SOC. AFF., CONSOLIDATED LIST OF PRODUCTS WHOSE CON-
SUMPTION AND/OR SALE HAVE BEEN BANNED, WITHDRAWN, OR SEVERELY RESTRICTED OR NOT 
APPROVED BY GOVERNMENTS, THIRTEENTH ISSUE 26–27 (2006) (adding Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria); 
U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. AND SOC. AFF., CONSOLIDATED LIST OF PRODUCTS WHOSE CONSUMPTION 
AND/OR SALE HAVE BEEN BANNED, WITHDRAWN, OR SEVERELY RESTRICTED OR NOT APPROVED 
BY GOVERNMENTS, FIFTEENTH ISSUE 13 (2009) (adding Guyana). Some of these reports are available 
online. See Publications, U.N. OFF. FOR ECOSOC SUPPORT AND COORDINATION, http://www.un.org/
esa/coordination/public.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/FG7D-ARFQ. 
 2 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REREGISTRATION ELIGIBILITY DECISION OF PENTACHLOROPHENOL 1 
(2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/oppsrrd1/REDs/pentachlorophenol_red.pdf and http://perma.
cc/FG7D-ARFQ. 
2014] Toxics from Telephone Poles: Should RCRA Apply? 15 
PCP and other toxic compounds into surrounding soil or water.3 The threat 
posed to humans and the environment by this pollution is controverted, and 
existing regulations have not offered avenues into the courts for resolution.4 
The main barrier has been a gap in regulation over treated poles that courts 
have refused to fill by broadly interpreting existing regulations.5 
PCP exposure causes high fever, profuse sweating, difficulty breathing, 
and damage to organs, tissue, and the immune system, and the EPA classifies 
the chemical as a probable carcinogen.6 Additionally, the production of PCP 
creates chlorinated dibenzodioxins7 (“dioxins”) and other micro-contaminants 
that form part of the PCP mixture that is applied to the utility poles.8 Akin to 
one of the toxic compounds in Agent Orange, dioxins cause severe skin diseas-
es such as Chloracne and might cause liver damage and hormone changes.9 
They are also probable carcinogens and, unlike PCP, do not quickly or easily 
break down once released into the environment, but persist in soil or remain in 
                                                                                                                           
 3 Id. at 1–2, 28. These figures represent approximately 60% of the total treated poles and 95.8% 
of the total treated cross-arms in service within the United States. Id. An estimated 3% of the treated 
poles are replaced annually. Id. 
 4 See id. at 27 (noting that major weaknesses in exposure assessment methods limit the validity of 
reported findings on PCP’s health effects, but that a reasonably strong argument can be made that PCP 
exposure causes a number of diseases), 37 (finding that PCP use will not present risks inconsistent 
with the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) with amended labeling); Greg 
Kidd, Wood Preservatives Cause Illness, 20 PESTICIDES AND YOU, no. 2, 2000, at 13, 15 (lamenting 
EPA inaction on the threat of wood preservatives to health and documenting specific cases of PCP 
and other wood preservatives on human health), available at http://www.beyondpesticides.org/
infoservices/pesticidesandyou/Summer%2000/Wood%20Preservatives%20Cause%20Illness.pdf and 
http://perma.cc/7AMK-EAJM. 
 5 See Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 713 F.3d 502, 510–12, 517–18 (9th Cir. 
2013) (noting that the EPA exempts pole pollution from RCRA’s hazardous waste regulations and 
holding that pole pollution is not subject to RCRA’s solid waste regulations nor the CWA’s point 
source regulations); Lee Karlsson et al., Pentachlorophenol Contamination of Private Drinking Water 
from Treated Utility Poles, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, no. 2, 2013, at 276 (noting that the EPA has 
exempted pole pollution from regulation under FIFRA. 
 6 AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE FOR 
PENTACHLOROPHENOL 5 (2001) [hereinafter ATSDR PCP REPORT], available at http://www.atsdr.
cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp51.pdf and http://perma.cc/S5XR-TWXU; Karlsson et al., supra note 5, at 276. 
 7 Dioxins and Their Effects on Human Health, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May 2010), http://
www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs225/en/, available at http://perma.cc/PR5R-BR8E. The chemi-
cal name for dioxin is: 2, 3, 7, 8–tetrachlorodibenzo para dioxin (TCDD). Id. The term “dioxins” is 
often used for a family of structurally and chemically related compounds, which includes the dioxins 
found in PCP. Id. TCDD is the most toxic dioxin, and the toxicity of related dioxins is expressed as a 
part of its toxicity. Id. PCP contains some of the more highly chlorinated dioxins but does not usually 
contain TCDD. AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, TOXICOLOGICAL PRO-
FILE FOR CHLORINATED DIBENZO-P-DIOXINS 2 (1998) [hereinafter ATSDR DIOXINS PROFILE], 
available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp104.pdf and http://perma.cc/P7PR-6HEV. 
 8 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 2, at 9. 
 9 ATSDR DIOXINS PROFILE, supra note 7, at 2 (explaining that TCDD was found in one of the 
defoliant compounds used in Agent Orange); AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGIS-
TRY, CHLORINATED DIBENZO-P-DIOXINS (CDDS) FACTSHEET 1 (1999), available at http://www.
atsdr.cdc.gov/tfacts104.pdf and http://perma.cc/8NVD-TKS4 (describing health effects of dioxins). 
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the bodies of animals, where they increase in concentration as they pass 
through the food chain.10 These characteristics have earned dioxins a spot 
among the Stockholm Convention’s “dirty dozen”—environmentally persistent 
chemicals that the signatory states have vowed to reduce or eliminate.11 
PCP is combined with oil diluents to create the mixture that is applied to 
the poles.12 Gravity pulls the oil and the PCP it contains down to the pole’s 
base once the pole has been set in the ground, where the mixture leaches into 
surrounding soil or water.13 Studies have shown that oil enhances the mobility 
of PCP and its contaminants in soil and thereby increases the risk of ground-
water contamination.14 This seems to have occurred recently in Vermont.15 In 
2009, the Vermont Department of Health (VDH) responded to complaints of a 
chemical-like odor in drinking water on two occasions and found PCP levels 
well over 1000 and 2000 times the maximum level set by the EPA.16 Subse-
quent testing suggested that the contamination resulted from PCP-treated poles 
that had been in contact with the water tables near the complainants’ respective 
wells.17 
                                                                                                                           
 10 ATSDR DIOXINS PROFILE, supra note 7, at 4; ATSDR PCP REPORT, supra note 6, at 159. This 
process is called biomagnification and can result in measurable levels of dioxins in aquatic creatures 
despite undetectable levels of dioxins in water. ATSDR DIOXINS PROFILE, supra note 7, at 4. 
 11 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, Annex C, pt. I, opened for signature 
May 22, 2001, 2256 U.N.T.S. 119 (entered into force May 17, 2004). The Stockholm Convention 
focuses on eliminating or reducing releases of twelve environmentally persistent chemicals, the so-
called ”dirty dozen.” Id. art. 1, 3; Persistent Organic Pollutants: A Global Issue, A Global Response, 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/oia/toxics/pop.html (last updated Dec. 2009), available 
at http://perma.cc/ZTA9-ALJX (providing an overview of the dirty dozen and Stockholm Conven-
tion). PCP contains other persistent organic compounds among the dirty dozen, including chlorinated 
dibenzofurans and hexachlorobenzene. Id.; ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 2, at 9. 
 12 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 2, at 28. 
 13 Id. at 29 (noting that the main mechanism causing migration of PCP and its contaminants is the 
downward migration of the oil vehicle along the vertical axis of the pole). 
 14 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 2, at 30 (noting that carrier oil potentially enhances the 
mobility of PCP once in the soil); Bulle et al., Enhanced Migration of Polychlorodibenzo-p-dioxins 
and Furans in the Presence of Pentachlorophenol-treated Oil in Soil Around Utility Poles: Screening 
Model Validation, 29 ENVTL. TOXICOLOGY & CHEMISTRY, no. 3, 2010, at 582, 587 [hereinafter Bulle 
et al., Enhanced Migration] (recognizing a risk of aquifer contamination under certain conditions); 
Bulle et al., Sensitivity Study of an OCDD Environmental Fate Screening Model in Soils in the Pres-
ence of PCP Wood-Preserving Oil, 73 CHEMOSPHERE S149, S150 (2008) (recognizing that the oil 
serves as vector and is itself preserved by the PCP, slowing the biodegradation of the oil that makes it 
capable of carrying the pole pollutants farther); Karlsson et al., supra note 5, at 276 (documenting 
cases of well water contamination from PCP-treated poles); cf. ATSDR PCP REPORT, supra note 6, at 
32 (noting a potential for enhanced toxicity and lethality when combined with oil). 
 15 See Karlsson et al., supra note 5, at 276 (documenting cases of contaminated groundwater in 
areas where upgradient PCP-treated poles existed). 
 16 Id. 
 17 See id. The first complaint involved pollution from a new utility pole upgradient of the private 
water source, and the second complaint involved pollution from three utility poles that had recently 
been replaced upgradient of a private spring. Id. 
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In cases such as these, finding a cause of action under existing regulations 
might be difficult.18 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Ecolog-
ical Rights Foundation v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. refused to use the Clean 
Water Act (CWA) and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) as 
regulatory tools to upend every pole in the country that emits PCP.19 The Ninth 
Circuit reserved the possibility, however, that RCRA might be applicable to 
pole pollution in specific circumstances.20 This Comment argues that the ac-
cumulation of PCP and its contaminants in soil around utility poles can fall 
under RCRA’s statutory scope under certain conditions.21 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
PCP has been used by a number of industries, including agriculture, tex-
tiles, oil drilling, and forestry.22 PCP was first registered for use as a pesticide 
in 1950 and soon became the most widely used biocide in the United States.23 
In 1984, the EPA completed a review of PCP under the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and concluded that PCP’s risks out-
weighed its benefits.24 In reaching a settlement agreement with producers, the 
EPA agreed in 1986 to reregister PCP but with substantial restrictions on its 
production and use.25 In 2000, PCP registrants elected to renew applications 
for PCP only as a heavy-duty wood preservative.26 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See No Spray Coalition v. City of New York, No. 00 CIV. 5395(JSM), 2000 WL 1401458, at 
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2000), aff’d, 252 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (finding the CWA and 
RCRA not applicable to pesticides at point of spray). FIFRA most clearly applies to the potential threat 
of PCP and its contaminants to health and the environment because it regulates the general use of the 
pesticide, but it does not provide for a private right of action. See id. at *1 (noting that the plaintiff’s 
attempt to litigate general harms of a pesticide under the inapplicable CWA and RCRA were probably 
due to an inability to do so under FIFRA). 
 19 See Ecological Rights Found., 713 F.3d at 505, 517. 
 20 Id. at 518. 
 21 See infra notes 106–112 and accompanying text. 
 22 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 2, at 1. 
 23 Id. at 1, 3. PCP has, however, been used for wood preservation since 1936. Id. at 1. The EPA 
estimates that 3200 metric tons of PCP was used for wood preservation in 1947 and 8000 tons in 
1990. See id. at 3 (providing figure from 1947); Memorandum from EPA Office of Prevention, Pesti-
cides and Toxic Substances to Adam Heyward, Project Manager 34, and Nader Elkassabany, Chemi-
cal Review Manager [hereinafter EPA Memorandum], available at http://www.epa.gov/opp00001/
chem_search/cleared_reviews/csr_PC-063001_19-Feb-99_035.pdf and http://perma.cc/H43G-JK9Q 
(providing figure from 1990). 
 24 Beyond Pesticides v. Whitman, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 25 Id.; see ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 2, at 3. The EPA restricted the purchase and use of 
PCP to certified applicators, prohibited its indoor application, required a more stringent manufacturing 
process to reduce byproduct contaminants, and canceled or limited many of its non-wood preservative 
uses. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 2, at 3. 
 26 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 2, at 3, 8. The term “heavy duty” wood preservative means 
that the PCP mixture is applied through a specialized process in closed retorts using high pressure. Id. 
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The EPA’s last review of PCP began in 1997 and ended in 2008 with a 
Reregistration Eligibility Decision (RED).27 In the RED, the EPA found that 
PCP’s benefits outweighed its costs in light of an apparent lack of viable alter-
natives to the utility industry.28 During this long review process, the EPA’s Sci-
ence Division had found that PCP poses an “unacceptable” cancer risk to chil-
dren.29 An EPA-contracted study had found treated wood to be a large reservoir 
of dioxins in the environment and pointed out inconsistencies in the EPA’s es-
timates of dioxin releases from PCP-treated wood.30 
The EPA did not address the earlier findings in its RED.31 Although the 
EPA may be challenged on the basis of its RED,32 FIFRA does not permit pri-
vate actions and otherwise exempts pesticides from regulation once applied to 
an article such as a utility pole.33 
Against this regulatory backdrop, in 2010 the Ecological Rights Founda-
tion (ERF) filed a citizen suit under the CWA and RCRA against Pacific Gas 
and Electric Company (“PG & E”) and Pacific Bell Telephone Company in 
                                                                                                                           
 27 Beyond Pesticides, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 4; ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 2, at 37. 
 28 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 2, at 37 (finding that the mitigation measures and label 
changes must be implemented), 39 (concluding a cost–benefit analysis). 
 29 EPA Memorandum, supra note 23, at 3, 5–6 (documenting an unacceptable cancer risk for 
children in a homeowner post-application setting from treated poles, and for an aggregate setting from 
PCP absent contaminants). 
 30 EASTERN RES. GROUP, REPORT OF THE MEETING TO PEER REVIEW: THE INVENTORY OF 
SOURCES OF DIOXIN IN THE UNITED STATES 3–2 (1998), available at http://cfpub.epa.gov/si/
si_public_record_report.cfm?dirEntryId=12379 and http://perma.cc/A4MF-WQTH (scroll down to 
“URL’s/Downloads” and follow hyperlink to report). “For example, EPA estimated that 25,000 grams 
TEQ of dioxin may be found in [PCP] used for wood treatment. This amount of dioxins is over eight 
times greater than EPA’s central estimate of total releases of dioxins to air, land, and water in 1995.” 
Id. “[D]ioxins on treated wood appear[] to be the largest flow of dioxins that were quantified, thus 
making treated wood a large reservoir of dioxins in the environment.” Id. Compare this with the 
EPA’s subsequently issued RED: “[PCP] is only one of many sources of [dioxins] in the environment 
making it difficult to quantify the portion of the aggregate environmental risk from [dioxins] that is 
attributable to [PCP] wood treatment uses.” ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 2, at 9. 
 31 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 2, at 17 (finding that residential risk assessment was 
not needed based on permitted use of PCP, but using data from another survey while not addressing 
residential risk assessment data that its Science Chapter had found), 31 (failing to consider overall 
dioxins releases from all preserved wood sources into the macro-environment as a factor). 
 32 See Beyond Pesticides, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 7. The court dismissed a FIFRA challenge to the 
EPA’s delay in reaching its RED of PCP because it lacked jurisdiction until the EPA made a final 
agency action. Id. The court stated that a final agency action would include a refusal to cancel or sus-
pend the pesticide’s use absent a hearing. Id. Thus, a FIFRA challenge to the agency’s reregistration 
of PCP might be ripe for challenge because the EPA’s 2008 RED of PCP constituted a final agency 
action. See id.; Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 11-cv-00293, 2013 WL 
1729573, at *14, *19 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (noting that FIFRA provides exclusive jurisdiction to an appel-
late court for a RED challenge because a RED constitutes an order issued by the Administrator fol-
lowing a public hearing). 
 33 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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federal district court.34 ERF alleged that the defendants violated, and were vio-
lating, the CWA by discharging “pollutant-bearing storm water runoff” from 
their utility poles into waters of the United States without a National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit and for having never obtained 
a NPDES permit in the first place, regardless of any discharges.35 Under ERF’s 
RCRA claim, the organization alleged that the defendants were contributing to 
“the past and present handling, storage, treatment, transportation and disposal 
of any solid or hazardous waste,” which washed off the poles by stormwater 
into nearby waters and thereby created an “imminent and substantial endan-
germent to health or the environment.”36 
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed 
ERF’s claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.37 The 
court granted the defendant’s motions; it dismissed the CWA claims on the rea-
soning that stormwater runoff containing pole pollution is not a point source 
discharge requiring a NPDES permit, and the RCRA claim on the reasoning 
that the pole pollution is not a solid waste under the regulatory scope of the 
statute.38 ERF then appealed the dismissal of its first CWA claim and its RCRA 
claim to the Ninth Circuit.39 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rul-
ing.40 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Clean Water Act (CWA) generally prohibits the discharge of any pol-
lutant from a point source without a permit pursuant to the National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).41 The NPDES permitting program is 
the “centerpiece” of the CWA and the primary method for enforcing the efflu-
ent and water-quality standards established by the EPA and state govern-
ments.42 The EPA, or a state to which the EPA has delegated its authority, may 
issue a NPDES permit “for the discharge of any pollutant” notwithstanding 
                                                                                                                           
 34 Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 803 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1058 (N.D. Cal. 
2011). 
 35 Ecological Rights Found., 713 F.3d at 507 (noting the poles were located in several California 
counties, including Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, and San Francisco). 
 36 Id. at 507. 
 37 Id. at 504. 
 38 See Ecological Rights Found., 803 F. Supp. 2d at 1063, 1065. 
 39 Ecological Rights Found., 713 F.3d at 507. 
 40 Id. at 504. 
 41 Ecological Rights Found. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 803 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 
2011). 
 42 Id. (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 636 F.3d 1235, 1245 (9th Cir. 
2011)). 
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prohibition elsewhere in the title.43 NPDES permits are required for discharges 
from any point source but not for discharges from nonpoint sources.44 
Stormwater that carries away pollutants presents a unique problem under 
the CWA because it is a significant source of water pollution but is inherently 
neither a point source nor nonpoint source.45 Congress amended the CWA to 
cover certain kinds of stormwater by using a categorical approach.46 The CWA 
only requires NPDES permits for stormwater that fits into one of the congres-
sionally defined categories and is discharged from a point source.47 
In Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, an environmental 
organization alleged that timber companies had violated the CWA by failing to 
obtain NPDES permits for their temporary logging roads.48 In relevant part, the 
plaintiff claimed that the logging roads were point sources that discharged 
stormwater runoff that fell into the defined category of “industrial activity.”49 
The Supreme Court dismissed the claim, however, because the Court deferred 
to the EPA’s interpretation of “industrial,” which only included activities asso-
ciated with fixed industrial manufacturing or processing sites, not temporary 
logging roads.50 
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) is a comprehen-
sive environmental statue that governs the treatment, storage, and disposal of 
solid and hazardous waste.51 These two types of waste have broad statutory 
definitions: “Solid waste” is any discarded material, and “hazardous waste” is 
a subset of “solid waste” that, “because of quantity, concentration [or other 
characteristics],” does affect or might affect human health or the environment 
                                                                                                                           
 43 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2006). 
 44 Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 713 F.3d 502, 505 (9th Cir. 2013); League 
of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2002). The CWA defines point 
source as “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, 
channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, [or] container . . . from which pollutants are or may be 
discharged.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). The CWA does not define “nonpoint source,” but the Ninth Circuit 
has interpreted it to mean those types of pollution that arise from many dispersed activities over large 
areas, and not traceable to any single discrete source. Ecological Rights Found., 713 F.3d at 508; see 
also League of Wilderness Defenders, 309 F.3d at 1184 (offering examples of nonpoint sources such 
as “the residue left on roadways by automobiles”). Nonpoint sources are not regulated through individ-
ual permits because their diffuse nature makes it impracticable to do so. See League of Wilderness De-
fenders, 309 F.3d at 1184. 
 45 Ecological Rights Found., 713 F.3d at 505. 
 46 See id. (characterizing the stormwater amendment as a “two-phase approach”). 
 47 See id. (recognizing “industrial activity” as the most significant of Phase I stormwater dis-
charges to this case, as it was the only category that the defendant included in its pleadings). 
 48 Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1336–37 (2013). 
 49 Id. at 1336–38 (describing the allegation that the roads are point sources because they chan-
neled stormwater through a system of ditches and culverts and into streams and rivers). 
 50 Id. at 1336–38. 
 51 Ecological Rights Found., 713 F.3d at 506. 
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in certain ways.52 RCRA can be enforced by the government or private citi-
zens.53 There are two possible claims under RCRA’s citizen suit provision: vio-
lation of its permitting regime, and a violation because of an “imminent and 
substantial endangerment” to health or the environment.54 
The EPA implements RCRA’s permitting regime.55 Owners and operators 
of facilities that treat, store, or dispose of hazardous waste must apply to the 
EPA for a permit to do so; the Act charges the EPA’s Administrator to deter-
mine what wastes constitute hazardous waste within the permitting regime.56 
These include solid waste that either the Administrator has specifically deemed 
a hazardous waste or those that exhibit any of four hazardous characteristics.57 
Because the latter condition could be over-encompassing for the purpose of the 
permitting regime, and because solid waste designation is a precondition for 
hazardous waste designation, the EPA has also passed regulations that narrow-
ly define solid waste to limit what wastes can in turn meet the four hazardous 
criteria; the EPA has thus defined “discarded” as “abandoned,” which is “dis-
posed of.”58 
As amicus, the EPA has further interpreted “disposed of” beyond its regu-
lations; the EPA’s general position is that a product is not “disposed of” when it 
enters the environment within its normal and expected use pattern and thus can 
be neither a solid nor hazardous waste under its permitting regime.59 This in-
terpretation includes pesticides and fertilizers that are applied to land and spent 
munitions that fall to the ground on a shooting range, because the normal ex-
pected use of these products includes application to the land.60 Thus, this regu-
                                                                                                                           
 52 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (2006) (defining “hazardous waste”); id. § 6903(27) (defining “solid 
waste”); Military Toxics Project v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 146 F.3d 948, 951 (D.C.C. 1998) (acknowl-
edging a distinction between broad and narrow definitions as per the statutory and regulatory provi-
sions of the Act, respectively). 
 53 Id. §§ 6972(a), 6973(a). 
 54 Id. § 6972(a); Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d 1305, 1314–
15 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 55 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a). 
 56 Military Toxics Project, 146 F.3d at 950–51. 
 57 Id. at 951; 40 C.F.R. § 261.2–.3 (2013). 
 58 Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199, 206, 208 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he words of 
the statute contemplate that the EPA would refine and narrow the definition of solid waste, for the 
purpose of the more stringent regulatory treatment afforded to hazardous wastes . . . where the permit-
ting provisions are located.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); 40 C.F.R. 
§ 261.1(b)(1). 
 59 Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n, 989 F.2d at 1316 (adopting the interpretation of the EPA as 
amicus); see also Amicus Curiae the United States of America’s Response to the Court’s August 5, 
2008, Order at *5–7, Cordiano, 575 F.3d 199 (No. 07-0795CV), 2008 WL 7566065 [hereinafter Ami-
cus Curiae, Cordiano]. 
 60 Cordiano, 575 F.3d at 208 (noting the EPA’s position on spent munitions); see, e.g., 40 C.F.R. 
§ 261.2(c)(ii) (“[C]ommercial chemical products . . . are not solid wastes if they are applied to the land 
and that is their ordinary manner of use.”); see also Military Toxics Project, 146 F.3d at 955 (noting 
the EPA’s self-described “longstanding interpretation” of the regulatory definition of solid waste as 
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latory definition of solid waste turns on whether the product is being used in its 
normal, intended manner, not the amount of time that the material lies unre-
covered.61 
The EPA only applies the narrow regulatory definition of solid waste to 
implement its permitting regime.62 Otherwise, the EPA explicitly applies the 
broad statutory definition—which stops at “discarded” and does not include 
the further definitions of “abandoned” and “disposed of” that import the re-
strictive concept of a product’s normal and expected use.63 The EPA, as ami-
cus, has also interpreted the broad statutory definition of solid waste, that is, a 
material that has been “discarded,” as encompassing that which has been “left 
to accumulate long after [it has] served [its] intended purpose.”64 The statutory 
definition of solid waste thus turns on the amount of time that passes as it ac-
cumulates in the environment, and not the manner in which it entered the envi-
ronment.65 
The Ninth and Second Circuits have both, in effect, deferred to the EPA’s 
dichotomous interpretation of solid waste.66 A citizen plaintiff that brings an 
“imminent and substantial endangerment” claim under RCRA’s statutory scope 
must allege that a particular waste is a solid waste that is in turn a “discarded 
material” which is “left to accumulate long after [it] ha[s] served [its] intended 
purpose.”67 
The Ninth Circuit first deciphered the statutory meaning of solid waste in 
Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer.68 There, the plaintiff brought an imminent and 
substantial endangerment claim against a group of bluegrass farmers and al-
leged that the farmers had left grass residue in their fields after harvest and 
subsequently burned it as a solid waste.69 The court ultimately consulted extra-
circuit interpretations of solid waste for EPA permitting claims to glean the 
                                                                                                                           
excluding products such as pesticides and fertilizers, the intended use of which involves application to 
the land). 
 61 Cordiano, 575 F.3d at 209; Amicus Curiae, Cordiano, supra note 59, at *9. 
 62 Military Toxics Project, 146 F.3d at 951; Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n, 989 F.2d at 1314. 
 63 See Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n, 989 F.2d at 1314, 1316. The court noted that the inter-
pretation by the EPA, as amicus, of the statutory solid waste is a function of time and does not include 
concepts of “abandoned” and “disposed of,” which the United States amicus in Cordiano stated was a 
function of use. See Cordiano, 575 F.3d at 209; see also Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n, 989 F.2d 
at 1316. 
 64 Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n, 989 F.2d at 1316. 
 65 Cordiano, 575 F.3d at 209; Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n, 989 F.2d at 1316. 
 66 See Ecological Rights Found., 713 F.3d at 515–18 (gleaning the EPA’s intent from its regula-
tions); Cordiano, 575 F.3d at 207 (deferring to the EPA’s regulatory interpretation of an ambiguous 
statute and then deferring to amicus’s interpretation of the regulations); Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s 
Ass’n, 989 F.2d at 1316 (adopting an interpretation of the EPA as amicus). 
 67 Ecological Rights Found., 713 F.3d at 518; Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n, 989 F.2d at 
1316. 
 68 Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1046 n.14 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 69 Id. at 1038. 
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EPA’s intent.70 The court concluded that grass residue was not “discarded” be-
cause it was destined for beneficial reuse in a continuous process of growing 
and harvesting crops by the generating industry.71 
The Second Circuit interpreted solid waste in Connecticut Coastal Fish-
ermen’s Ass’n v. Remington Arms Co. and No Spray Coalition v. City of New 
York.72 In the former case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated both 
RCRA provisions by allowing lead shot and clay skeet to accumulate over the 
span of decades on a shooting range, which contaminated the environment.73 
The court proceeded through the steps of Chevron analysis and granted defer-
ence to the EPA’s solid waste dichotomy.74 The court found that the allegations 
did not amount to a permitting violation within RCRA’s regulatory scope.75 
The court then found that the lead shot and clay skeet fragments had been 
“discarded” and “left to accumulate long after [they had] served [their] intend-
ed purpose” and were thus solid wastes according to the broad statutory defini-
tion.76 
In No Spray Coalition, the plaintiff alleged that a pesticide became a stat-
utory solid waste under RCRA when sprayed from helicopters and trucks be-
cause it was “discarded” at that point.77 The Second Circuit upheld the district 
court’s finding that the pesticide could not be a solid waste that was “discard-
ed” until after it had served its intended purpose.78 The Second Circuit rea-
                                                                                                                           
 70 Id. at 1041–43, 1045. The dissent argued that the majority’s extra-circuit basis for interpreta-
tion was misplaced: “[T]he regulatory definition considered in [those cases] is significantly narrower 
than the statutory definition at issue here. Accordingly, I do not find these cases persuasive in our 
determination of whether the post-harvest crop residue has been ‘discarded.’” Id. at 1051 (Paez, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 71 Id. at 1046. The court also cited two other extra-circuit findings on waste re-use through a con-
tinuous cycle that add conditions to the first. Id. at 1045. Despite involving permitting claims, these 
cases were decided prior to the EPA’s firm distinction between the two definitions, but as the court in 
Connecticut Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n noted, these cases still show that in-process materials destined 
for re-use cannot be a statutory solid waste because the very nature of a continuous cycle of reuse 
precludes accumulation for a sufficient period of time. See 989 F.2d at 1316. 
 72 No Spray Coalition v. City of New York, 252 F.3d 148, 150 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam); Conn. 
Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n, 989 F.2d at 1308, 1316. 
 73 Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n, 989 F.2d at 1309. 
 74 Id. at 1313–15. The court used the statutory interpretation methodology outlined by the Su-
preme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984), which directs a reviewing court to defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambig-
uous statute when congressional intent and purpose are not clear. See Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s 
Ass’n, 989 F.2d at 1313–15. 
 75 Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n, 989 F.2d at 1315–16. The court dismissed the permitting 
violation claim before determining whether the spent munitions were “solid waste” according to the 
regulatory definition. Id. 
 76 Id. at 1316. The court deferred to the EPA, as amicus, which opined that the spent munitions 
qualified as “solid wastes” only under RCRA’s statutory scope. Id. 
 77 No Spray Coalition v. City of New York, No. 00 CIV. 5395(JSM), 2000 WL 1401458, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2000), aff’d, 252 F.3d 148. 
 78 No Spray Coalition, 252 F.3d at 150; No Spray Coalition, 2000 WL 1401458, at *4. 
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soned that this had not yet occurred when the pesticide was sprayed from the 
vehicle applicators because the pesticide had yet to drift through the air and 
come to rest on mosquitos and their habitats.79 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Ecological Rights Foundation v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co., the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of 
the action for failure to state a claim, without leave to amend.80 The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the utility poles did not require National Permit Discharge Elimi-
nation System (NPDES) permits under the Clean Water Act (CWA), and that 
the pentachlorophenol (PCP) mixture that leached from the poles was not a 
solid waste within the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act’s (RCRA) 
regulatory scope.81 
First, the court found that the PCP-treated poles did not require NPDES 
permits because they were not point sources.82 The court noted that the CWA 
was ambiguous on the issue and that the EPA had not yet determined whether 
utility poles were point sources, which precluded agency deferral, but the court 
was nevertheless unpersuaded by the Ecological Rights Foundation’s (ERF) 
characterization of a point source as any “identifiable thing.”83 Instead, the 
court turned to precedent, which overwhelmingly cut against ERF’s expansive 
reading.84 Utility poles, the court concluded, simply are not discernible, con-
fined, and discrete conveyances that channel and control stormwater.85 The 
court also found that the stormwater runoff that carried the utility pole pollu-
tion was not associated with industrial activity, which provided another inde-
pendent basis to dismiss the CWA claims regardless of whether the poles were 
point sources.86 
                                                                                                                           
 79 No Spray Coalition, 252 F.3d at 150. 
 80 Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 713 F.3d 502, 504 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 81 Id. at 505. 
 82 Id. at 510. 
 83 Id. at 509. 
 84 Id. at 509–10. 
 85 Id. at 510. 
 86 Ecological Rights Found., 713 F.3d at 511–12. The court gave four independent reasons: First, 
the EPA defined “discharge associated with industrial activity” as that which is “directly related to 
manufacturing, processing, or raw materials storage at an industrial plant.” Id. at 512 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). A utility pole, the court reasoned, was none of those things, nor would a contrary 
interpretation be in line with Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, 133 S. Ct. 1326 
(2013), where the Supreme Court granted deference to the EPA’s more recent and narrower interpre-
tation of “industrial activity” as “extend[ing] only to traditional industrial buildings such as factories 
and associated sites, as well as other relatively fixed facilities.” Ecological Rights Found., 713 F.3d at 
512 (declining to determine whether utility poles are more permanent than logging roads). Second, the 
Court found that stormwater runoff from the poles was not “associated with industrial activity” ac-
cording to the Standard Industrial Classification System codes. Id. Third, it inferred from the EPA’s 
explicit rejection of “major electrical powerline corridors” from NPDES that the EPA did not intend 
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Regarding the RCRA claim, the Ninth Circuit noted that the statutory def-
inition of solid waste as “discarded” was ambiguous and thus looked to the 
Act’s legislative history.87 The court observed that Congress designed the Act 
to “eliminate the last remaining loophole in environmental law” by regulating 
waste byproducts of the nation’s manufacturing processes and manufactured 
products.88 A product cannot therefore be “discarded” and thus a “solid waste” 
until it has served its intended purpose and is no longer wanted by the consum-
er.89 
Because the ERF did not allege that the PCP mixture accumulated in the 
environment long after serving its intended purpose, the court analyzed the 
mixture under the EPA’s narrow regulatory definition of solid waste.90 The 
court held that the PCP mixture that escapes from a pole by natural means is an 
expected consequence of the preservative’s ordinary and intended use and thus 
has not been discarded.91 The court ended on a different note, however, and 
stressed that it has not decided whether dangerous accumulations of PCP had 
resulted from the natural discharge of wood preservative from the defendants’ 
poles.92 
To invoke the statutory definition of solid waste under a “substantial en-
dangerment” claim, Ecological Rights Foundation and Safe Air for Everyone v. 
Meyer demonstrate that a plaintiff must allege that a particular waste has ac-
cumulated in the environment for an amount of time that shows that the waste 
is not destined for immediate reuse or cleanup.93 These allegations will cir-
cumvent the EPA’s regulatory version of solid waste and its restrictive “ex-
pected consequence of its ordinary and intended use” language, and instead 
                                                                                                                           
to regulate individual utility poles either. Id. at 513. Finally, it noted that a contrary finding could 
extend the regulation to cover “anything that might contaminate stormwater.” Id. 
 87 Ecological Rights Found., 713 F.3d at 514–15. 
 88 Id. at 515 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1491(I), at 4 (1976)). 
 89 Id. 
 90 See id. at 518. The court looked to the EPA’s intent, analogizing the PCP mixture to the EPA’s 
treatment of spent munitions, which the EPA does not consider discarded because it focuses on 
whether a product was used as it was intended to be used, not on whether the purpose of the product is 
to perform some function once on the ground. Id. The court then observed that the EPA approved 
PCP-based wood preservative for use in utility poles under FIFRA, demonstrating that the EPA did 
not expect or intend for the preservative to be a solid waste under its RCRA regulations. Id. at 516–17. 
Finally, it noted that the EPA explicitly exempted PCP from hazardous waste status when it is im-
pregnated in wood or dirt, unless as a result of a spill of unused PCP, which also demonstrated that the 
EPA did not intend to regulate it as a solid waste. Id. at 517. 
 91 Id. at 516. The court also detailed the untenable results of a contrary finding: About 36 million 
utility poles would have to be replaced if the PCP mixture was found to be a regulatory solid waste. 
Id. at 517–18. Furthermore, it would potentially expand RCRA to cover everything from PCP-treated 
railroad ties to lead paint that naturally chips away from houses. Id. 
 92 Id. at 518. 
 93 Ecological Rights Found., 713 F.3d at 518; Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 
1045 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d 
1305, 1316 (2d Cir. 1993); supra notes 59–65 and accompanying text. 
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will focus a court’s analysis on how long the pole pollution has accumulated in 
the environment rather than how it ended up there.94 
In Connecticut Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Remington Arms Co., the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that seventy years was 
long enough for 2400 tons of lead shot to accumulate on a shooting range and 
become a statutory solid waste.95 Due to the effects of gravity on the oil that 
carries the PCP mixture, a newly treated and set pole emits pollution into the 
environment around its base within the first few years of its installation and at 
a lesser but constant rate thereafter.96 PCP has a half-life of up to sixty-three 
days, and the half-life can vary depending on soil, water, and sunlight.97 Diox-
ins, however, have half-lives in soil that range from fifteen to one hundred 
years.98 Therefore, in the absence of periodic soil remediation by utility com-
panies, PCP and its contaminants accumulate around the base of each treated 
pole for significant amounts of time.99 
The court in Connecticut Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n did not comment on 
the amount of lead and clay waste that had accumulated, but it is clear that the 
site had more waste spread over a larger area than any one pole.100 PCP and its 
contaminants migrate to soil as deep as two meters below the base of a pole,101 
                                                                                                                           
 94 Ecological Rights Found., 713 F.3d at 516, 518; Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n, 989 F.2d at 
1316; cf. Cmty. Ass’n for Restoration of the Env’t v. George & Margaret LLC, No. 13-CV-3017-
TOR, 2013 WL 3188821, at *4 (E.D. Wa. June 21, 2013). Here, a district court in the Ninth Circuit 
refused to dismiss the plaintiff’s allegations of a RCRA solid waste in the wake of Ecological Rights 
Foundation, 713 F.3d at 518. Cmty. Ass’n for Restoration of the Env’t, 2013 WL 3188821, at *5. The 
court found that the use of animal waste as fertilizer was not a beneficial reuse when applied beyond 
what is necessary to serve as fertilizer. Id. at *4. This finding should be read in the context of Con-
gress’s express findings related to agricultural waste: excluding material when put to a beneficial 
reuse. Id.; see also Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1045 (finding that bluegrass residue burned for 
the purpose of agricultural soil enhancement was a beneficial reuse and thus not a solid waste). 
 95 Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n, 989 F.2d at 1308, 1316. 
 96 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY supra note 2, at 29–30 (explaining different processes by which pole 
pollution leaches into environment over time). 
 97 EPA Memorandum, supra note 23, at 7; see AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE 
REGISTRY, PENTACHLOROPHENOL 1 (2001), available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfacts51.pdf and 
http://perma.cc/G9TN-AGS9. 
 98 EPA Memorandum, supra note 23, at 25–26. 
 99 Id. at 35 (estimating that the annual loss of PCP per pole is 6.6 grams); see Bulle et al., Enhanced 
Migration, supra note 14, at 587 (noting that PCP that leached from utility poles accounted for approxi-
mately forty-seven percent of total national PCP emissions to Canadian soil); cf. Conn. Coastal Fisher-
men’s Ass’n, 989 F.2d at 1316 (finding spent munitions to be a solid waste after they had accumulated); 
Simsbury-Avon Pres. Soc’y v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., Civil No. 3:04cv803(JBA), 2006 WL 2223946, 
at *9 (D. Conn. Aug. 2, 2006) (finding insufficient evidence that munitions had been “discarded” on the 
defendant’s site in light of defendant’s uncontested evidence that spent casings and munitions were peri-
odically removed). 
 100 See Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n, 989 F.2d at 1308 (describing the extent of munitions 
waste and annual number of patrons). 
 101 Bulle et al., Enhanced Migration, supra note 14, at 587. The study selected poles that had 
been installed after 1987, the year in which the EPA had mandated new production methods to reduce 
byproduct contaminants. Id. at 582–83. Any pole—not just one that had been installed before 1987—
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under specific conditions, and nearly up to a foot horizontally.102 Each of these 
areas is separated from the next, and each individual location would have 
much less waste than the contaminated shooting range.103 This should not in-
fluence a finding of solid waste, however, because qualitatively different 
wastes in varying environments can pose greater or lesser threats irrespective 
of their comparative quantities.104 Whether the contaminants, once designated 
as solid wastes, pose an imminent or substantial threat to health or the envi-
ronment is a separate issue.105 
The temporal link between PCP mixture that migrates into and accumu-
lates in soil beneath a pole to the PCP mixture’s intended purpose is attenuat-
ed.106 Unlike the pesticide in No Spray Coalition v. City of New York that had 
not yet served its purpose by reaching and killing its intended target—
mosquitos—the PCP mixture that has migrated through the soil has already 
served its purpose by having preserved the pole from which it escaped.107 Fur-
thermore, the dioxins that have migrated along with the PCP can remain there 
for many decades after the PCP itself has degraded—at which point it is no 
longer part of the substance that was originally used to preserve the wood.108 
Thus, allegations that detail the environmental fates of dioxins in specific soil 
                                                                                                                           
can therefore contaminate a sufficiently proximate aquifer if placed in a soil conducive to migration. 
See id. 
 102 See EPA Memorandum, supra note 23, at 33–37. One study found that PCP concentration 
decreased greatly between horizontal distances of three to eight inches. Id. at 35. Two studies found 
that PCP levels were at non-detect levels at a horizontal distance of forty inches from the base of the 
pole. Id. at 35, 37. 
 103 See Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n, 989 F.2d at 1308 (noting that the shooting range admit-
ted 40,000 patrons annually and had accumulated 2400 tons of lead shot and 11 million pounds of 
clay target fragments, which suggests a large area). 
 104 See id. at 1316 (observing that the time during which the waste had accumulated was a factor, 
without specifying a specific timeframe); Benjamin v. Douglas Ridge Rifle Club, 673 F. Supp. 2d 
1210, 1222 (D. Or. 2009) (finding that lead shot was a solid waste because it had accumulated since 
1955). These cases do not comment on an accumulation beyond an unspecified period of time that 
shows the material is not destined for reuse. See Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n, 989 F.2d at 1308, 
1316; Douglas Ridge Rifle Club, 673 F. Supp. 2d at 1222. 
 105 See generally Maine People’s Alliance v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(demonstrating necessary evidence to support a finding that a solid waste poses an imminent and sub-
stantial risk to health or the environment). 
 106 See No Spray Coalition v. City of New York, No. 00 CIV. 5395(JSM), 2000 WL 1401458, at 
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2000), aff’d, 252 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 
 107 See id.; cf. Cmty. Ass’n for Restoration of the Env’t, 2013 WL 3188821, at *4 (finding that 
fertilizer became waste when applied beyond what was needed to fertilize land); Zands v. Nelson, 779 
F. Supp. 1254, 1261–62 (S.D. Cal. 1991) (finding that gasoline leaked from tanks at gasoline stations 
is a disposal of solid waste because it is no longer a useful product after it leaks into the soil, and has 
thus been “abandoned” via the leakage). 
 108 See Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n, 989 F.2d at 1316 (similar accumulations of lead shot 
found to be solid waste); cf. No Spray Coalition, 2000 WL 1401458, at *4 (unlike pesticides that can 
continue to kill pests according to their approved use). 
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conditions, and not merely that of PCP, can contribute to a RCRA statutory 
solid waste finding.109 
The Virginia well water contamination cases demonstrate that PCP itself 
can accumulate to dangerous levels when the poles contact a water table.110 
Unlike the pollution in Ecological Rights Foundation that allegedly washed 
from the poles into streams and tributaries, the PCP mixture in these cases did 
not wash anywhere but leached into and remained in adjacent water tables and 
wells, accumulating to levels up to 2000 times past that which the EPA consid-
ers safe.111 These facts seem much more in line with what the court in Ecologi-
cal Rights Foundation expressly reserved from its holding to decide on another 
day: the circumstances in which dangerous accumulations of pole pollution 
can trigger RCRA’s statutory version of solid waste.112 
CONCLUSION 
The statutory definition of solid waste turns on a factor of time, which is 
just a proxy condition that helps shed light on whether a particular material has 
actually been thrown away for good or will be picked up for recycle or reuse at 
some later date. Once a material is deemed a solid waste, it must also create or 
have the potential to create an imminent and substantial endangerment to 
health or the environment to incur liability under the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act (RCRA). Scientific studies, as demonstrated by the EPA’s 
aggregation of data in its 2008 Renewal Eligibility Decision of pentachloro-
phenol (PCP) under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 
do not clearly show the extent of harm that utility pole pollution poses to 
health and the environment. This limited data would probably not provide a 
basis for a court to find that every pole across the country, in any and all envi-
                                                                                                                           
 109 See Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n, 989 F.2d at 1316 (finding importance of accumulation); 
EPA Memorandum, supra note 97, at 25 (noting dioxins’ environmental persistence). 
 110 Karlsson et al., supra note 5, at 276; see ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 2, at 30 (ac-
knowledging the risk of groundwater contamination by PCP in situations where the pole is directly in 
contact with a water table or from the leaching of pollution from multiple poles that have been stored 
together). 
 111 See Ecological Rights Found., 713 F.3d at 518 (finding that wood preservative that is washed 
or blown away from utility poles by natural means is an expected consequence of the its intended use 
and thus not “discarded”); ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 2, at 28 (explaining that the main 
mechanism that emits pole pollution into the environment is not from rainwater that washes it from 
the pole’s surface, but gravity that pulls the oil vehicle along with the pollutants down the pole and out 
from its base); Karlsson et al., supra note 5, at 276. 
 112 See Ecological Rights Found., 713 F.3d at 518 (stating that it did not decide whether pole 
pollution becomes a solid waste when it accumulates because ERF did not allege that dangerous ac-
cumulations of PCP resulted from the natural discharge of the poles); ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra 
note 2, at 32 (noting that environmental risk from PCP contaminants comes not from stormwater run-
off but rather from soil accumulation); Karlsson et al., supra note 5, at 276 (noting accumulations of 
PCP at 1000 and 2000 times the level that the EPA deems safe). 
2014] Toxics from Telephone Poles: Should RCRA Apply? 29 
ronmental conditions, poses an imminent and substantial threat to health or the 
environment. Yet poles that have been placed in contact with water tables or in 
soil conditions most amenable to the enhanced migration of the pollutants have 
caused well water contamination. In these and similar cases, a court might find 
that PCP and its contaminants fit under the statutory definition of solid waste 
and in turn pose a threat sufficient to incur liability under RCRA. 
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